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Abstract 
This study examines the effect of legal central bank independence on inflation in developing countries. In spite of the 
policy consensus suggesting that central bank independence is an effective tool to control inflation, the evidence is still 
limited, particularly for developing countries. Using a novel dataset, we analyze the effect of central bank independence 
on inflation for a sample of 118 developing countries between 1980 and 2013. We find that higher central bank 
independence is associated with lower inflation rates. This effect on inflation is stronger the more democratic a country 
is, but it is also present in non-democratic countries. Our results are robust to different specifications and 
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1 Introduction 
Is central bank independence an effective tool to control inflation in developing countries? Price 
stability is the major monetary policy objective of most central banks. The motivation behind 
this objective is the widely studied notion that inflation, above a certain threshold, is detrimental 
to the real economy (Sidrauski, 1967; Tobin, 1965).1 Developing countries are especially 
vulnerable to the negative effects of high inflation (Bick, 2010; Bittencourt, 2012; Burdekin et al., 
2004; Ibarra and Trupkin, 2016; Kremer et al., 2013, among others). Therefore, much research 
has been devoted to find policies and institutions that promote price stability. Since the late 
1980s, central bank independence – that is, allowing central banks to control monetary 
instruments without political interference – became the key institutional recipe to fight inflation, 
and inspired a wave of reforms in central banks around the world (Goodfriend, 2007). Although 
most countries granted more independence to their central banks, there is no conclusive 
evidence of a general negative relationship between central bank independence and inflation for 
developing countries (Alpanda and Honig, 2014; Cukierman, 1992; Neyapti, 2012). 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of central bank independence (CBI) on 
inflation in developing countries. We use a novel dataset coded by Garriga (2016) on legal CBI, 
and find evidence that more independent central banks are associated with lower inflation rates 
in developing countries. This effect on inflation is stronger the more democratic a country is, but 
it is also present in non-democratic countries. Our empirical analysis differs from previous work 
because we explicitly account for both political and monetary institutional constraints, and 
because we use alternative estimation techniques. In particular, our results are robust when we 
use instrumental variables and the GMM systems estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell 
and Bond, 1998) to take explicitly into account potential endogeneity concerns. Our results are 
also robust to different model specifications, methodologies, and subsamples. 
We contribute to the literatures on central banking and on the economic effects of 
institutions. First, we empirically analyze the effect of CBI on inflation using a panel of 118 
developing countries, with yearly data between 1980 and 2013. To our knowledge, this is the 
largest sample used in these types of studies. The coverage and frequency of our data give us 
                                               
1 The view that high inflation is harmful for economies relies not only on theoretical arguments (for 
instance, Fischer and Modigliani, 1978; Orphanides and Solow, 1990), but also on numerous empirical 
studies (Barro, 1995; Bruno and Easterly, 1998; Fischer, 1993; Levine and Renelt, 1991; Li and Zou, 2002, 
among others). 
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confidence that the selection of cases or choices regarding periodization –such as using data in 5- 
or 10-year periods– are not affecting out results.  
Second, we show that legal CBI has robust inflation-curbing effects in the majority of 
developing countries. Previous literature has found this effect in small subsets of developing 
countries (Acemoglu et al., 2008; Bodea and Hicks, 2015a; Jácome and Vázquez, 2008; Klomp 
and de Haan, 2010a; Landström, 2011), questioning the generalizability of the anti-inflationary 
effects attributed to CBI. In contrast, we find strong evidence that in most developing countries, 
enhancing the independence of the central bank can reduce the inflation rate between 1 and 6 
percentage points, on average.2 Interestingly, this effect is stronger in more democratic 
developing countries, but is also present in non-democracies.  
Third, from a conceptual perspective, we show that all dimensions included in the definition 
of our legal CBI index matter. The analysis by components of the CBI index suggests that all 
dimensions weighed in our measure are significantly associated with lower inflation rates.3 This is 
not a trivial result. The multidimensional feature of the aggregate CBI index captures a variety of 
effects, suggesting possible directions to reform central banks. 
Finally, our results contribute to the growing literature studying the effects of political and 
monetary institutions in autocracies (Bodea et al., 2019; Boix and Svolik, 2013; Gandhi, 2008; 
Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Gehlbach and Keefer, 2012; Magaloni, 2008). Contrasting with 
previous work, which relied on small and less representative samples, we find robust evidence 
that CBI has a negative effect on inflation for a considerable set of non-democratic countries. In 
particular, our findings open new questions regarding the interactions between monetary 
institutions and exchange rate regimes as commitment mechanisms in non-democratic contexts 
(Bodea, 2010; Guisinger and Singer, 2010; Rodriguez, 2016; Steinberg and Malhotra, 2014). 
 
                                               
2 These figures come from Table 2 and refer to the average change from a low to a high CBI for autocracies 
and full democracies, respectively.  
3 The construction of the dataset follows Cukierman et al. (1992) rules to weigh in a single index the 
following dimensions: personnel independence, central bank objectives, policy independence, and financial 
independence. Appendix 1 lists the variables included in each dimension. 
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2 The relationship between CBI and inflation 
When governments have discretionary control over monetary instruments, they can prioritize 
other policy goals over price stability throughout their tenure. In particular, after nominal wages 
are set, politicians may be tempted to use monetary policy to produce short-term boosts in 
employment and output for electoral purposes, raising inflation. To overcome the time-
inconsistency of commitments to price stability, and their inflationary bias (Kydland and 
Prescott, 1977), the literature stresses the benefits of enforced commitments (rules) over 
discretion (Barro and Gordon, 1983a, 1983b). In particular, Rogoff (1985) makes a case for 
delegating monetary policy to independent central banks. Once central bankers are insulated 
from political pressures, commitments to price stability can be credible, helping to maintain low 
inflation. 
Following these ideas, a considerable policy consensus grew around the potential of CBI 
to promote inflation stability (Bernhard et al., 2002; International Monetary Fund, 1999; Kern et 
al., 2019; World Bank, 1992). Numerous countries followed this policy advice. Between 1985 and 
2012, and excluding the creation of regional central banks, there were 266 reforms to the 
statutory independence of central banks, 236 of which occurring in developing countries. Most 
of these reforms (77%) strengthened CBI (Garriga, 2016). See Figure 1. In spite of the broad 
impact of this policy advice, the empirical evidence backing it still is controversial, especially for 
developing countries.4  Figure 1 shows the reforms in OECD and non-OECD countries in this 
period.  
 
  
                                               
4 Although the figure shows several reforms affecting CBI before the mid-1980s (80 reforms), the 52 CBI 
increases in this period seem to respond to different motivations, such as transferring the governance of 
monetary policy to newly created central banks (31 cases). 
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Figure 1. Reforms to CBI in OECD and non-OECD countries, per year and effect of the reform 
on CBI scores. 
 
 
Notes: Reforms that increase CBI are coded as positive numbers (bars above the zero line), and reforms that 
decrease CBI are coded as negative numbers (bars below the zero line). Darker colors indicate reforms in 
developing countries, and lighter colors indicate the reforms in OECD countries. Data from Garriga (2016). 
Regional central banks omitted.  
 
Numerous studies find that CBI is associated with lower inflation in developed countries 
(e.g., Alesina and Summers, 1993; Arnone and Romelli, 2013; Cukierman, 1992; Klomp and De 
Haan, 2010; Persson and Tabellini, 1990). For developing countries, however, there is no 
evidence of a general negative relationship between legal CBI and inflation (Bagheri and Habibi, 
1998; Crowe and Meade, 2007; Cukierman, 1992; Desai et al., 2003; Klomp and de Haan, 
2010b). Some studies have found this correlation in Latin American countries (Jácome and 
Vázquez, 2008), in former communist countries (Loungani and Sheets, 1997; Neyapti, 2001), in 
developing democracies (Bodea and Hicks, 2015a), in countries with a medium level of political 
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constraints (Acemoglu et al., 2008), in countries with high inflation (Landström, 2011), and in 
small subsamples of countries (Klomp and de Haan, 2010a; Nurbayev, 2017). 
In spite of these mixed results, CBI still is an important signal regarding price stability for 
markets and policymakers.5 In fact, shielding the central bank from political pressures increases 
its credibility and helps mitigate the dynamic inconsistency problem often faced by developing 
countries (Bodea and Hicks, 2015b). In this context, we revisit the relationship between the 
independence of central banks and inflation. 
 
3 Data and methods 
3.1 Our measurement of CBI 
We measure the independence of central banks with data on legal CBI from Garriga (2016). 
Given the nature of the question we are addressing, a de jure index is an appropriate indicator of 
CBI for three reasons. First, since we want to study the effect of a policy on a key outcome 
variable like inflation, a legal measure of CBI is a good indicator of the extent to which countries 
followed such policy advice.6 This is in line with important research using a variety of different 
measures of legal independence to compare central banks features across countries and time 
(Acemoglu et al., 2008; Alesina et al., 1989; Bodea and Hicks, 2015b; Cukierman, 1992; Eijffinger 
and Schaling, 1997; Grilli et al., 1991).7 Second, de jure indices focus on specific claims contained 
in central bank statutes and, thus, are less biased by the presence of possible subjective 
judgments. 
                                               
5 See for example the OECD discussion for greater CBI in Argentina (OECD, 2017). 
6 Furthermore, some scholars argue that the mere adoption of a legal statute guaranteeing CBI dampens 
inflationary expectations in the economy (Arnone and Romelli, 2013; Polillo and Guillén, 2005). 
7 Ideally, we would like to have a measure that reflects the effect of legal independence on the actual behavior 
of the central bank. This tends to be especially important in developing countries, where the distance 
between the law and the government’s behavior may be wider than in developed ones. However, as Arnone 
and Romelli (2013)and Blancheton (2016) argue, such a measure is not easy to define. Background 
characteristics associated with the monetary system, its credibility, the degree of openness of the economy, 
and the development of the financial system play a determinant role. 
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Third, there is not an obviously better measure of CBI for the purposes of our study. On 
the one hand, other de jure measures are not free from criticism (de Haan and Kooi, 2000; 
Klomp and de Haan, 2010b). Furthermore, Acemoglu et al. (2008) argue that the Cukierman et 
al.’s (1992) index is the most commonly used de jure CBI index. Other studies that have updated 
or expanded Cukierman’s et al.’s index have a much smaller geographic and temporal coverage 
(Bodea and Hicks, 2015b; Dincer and Eichengreen, 2014).8 On the other hand, the alternative de 
facto index, the turnover rate of the central bank governor (TOR), associates the independence 
of this institution to the autonomy of its governor (Cukierman and Webb, 1995; de Haan and 
Siermann, 1996). 9 As Arnone and Romelli (2013) and Masciandro and Romelli (2013) argue, by 
not taking into consideration the independence of the other members of the board of directors, 
such an index might over or underestimate the degree of CBI. Still, for robustness checks, we 
also consider a measure of TOR (Dreher et al., 2010, 2008). 
The legal CBI index from Garriga (2016) uses Cukierman, et al.’s (1992) criteria to code 
variables describing characteristics of the chief executive officer of the bank (appointment, 
dismissal, and term of office), the bank’s policy formulation attributions (who formulates and 
has the final decision in monetary policy, and the role of the central bank in the budget process), 
objectives, and limitations on lending to the public sector. The scores are combined in a single 
index that ranges from 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest independence). Appendix 1 lists the variables 
included and their weights. Garriga’s dataset covers 159 non-OECD countries, from 1970 to 
2012, significantly expanding Cukierman et al.’s (1992) own data, and other efforts to extend 
them (Bodea and Hicks, 2015a; Crowe and Meade, 2007; Polillo and Guillén, 2005). 
Furthermore, the data’s frequency permits analyzing yearly data, avoiding potential problems of 
using cross-sectional data, or data in 5- or 10-year periods (Acemoglu et al., 2008; Bagheri and 
Habibi, 1998; Neyapti, 2012; Nurbayev, 2017). 
                                               
8 Bodea and Hicks (2015b) code 72 countries between 1972 and 2010. Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) code 
86 countries between 1998 and 2010. We rely on Garriga’s data set because it allows us to include all regions 
of the world, with more years in our sample, reducing the risks of selection bias. We thank an anonymous 
referee for encouraging this discussion. 
9 A behavioral measure of CBI is not compatible with this study given that we analyze the effect of an 
institutional reform (legal CBI) on a key policy variable (inflation).  
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3.2 Data  
We test the relationship between CBI and inflation on a sample of 118 non-OECD countries 
between 1980 and 2013. We exclude observations pertaining to regional central banks, as in 
Bodea and Hicks (2015a).10  Appendix 2 lists the countries included in the sample.  
Our dependent variable is the log of the inflation rate, measured as the log of the average 
monthly change in the consumer price index (as in Aisen and Veiga, 2006). Given that some 
countries have extremely high inflation rates, using inflation instead of its log would make these 
high-inflation observations more influential (Klomp and de Haan, 2010b).11 Furthermore, 
Klomp and de Haan’s (2010b) meta-analysis confirms that the use of the logarithm of inflation 
instead of actual inflation as dependent variable has no effect on the significance of the CBI 
coefficient and at the same time mitigates problems of heteroscedasticity and outliers (as in 
Aisen and Veiga, 2006). Mathematically, the inflation rate in year t ( t) is the annual percent 
change in the monthly average consumer price index (CPI), that is  
!" = $% ∑ '()*,",-*., 121∑ '()*,"2,,-*., 121 3 − 15100 
where CPIi,t and CPIi,t-1 capture the country’s average consumer price index in month i of 
year t and t-1, respectively. For robustness checks, we also consider two alternative measures of 
inflation used in the literature. First, to take into account hyperinflation episodes, we define a 
modified inflation rate D as p/(1+ p) where p  is the inflation rate. 12 This standardization leads to 
                                               
10 Although our sample includes 118 countries, our specifications include fewer countries because of the 
non-overlapping coverage of one of our control variables: our data on  democracies include 110 and 116 
countries depending on whether we use Polity2 or Freedom House, respectively, – and these subsamples 
do not completely overlap. Therefore, when we use Polity2 we have a maximum of 110 countries while 
when we use Freedom House we have a maximum of 116 countries. Furthermore, the exclusion of 
observations with regional central banks, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable, and missing data for 
other observations also reduce our sample size. 
11 In fact, correcting for outliers may affect the significance of the CBI indicator (Klomp and de Haan, 
2010a). 
12 For price increases, this modified inflation rate D takes a value from 0 to 1, while with price decreases it 
ranges between -1 and 0.  
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a smoother dynamic of the inflation rate (Cukierman et al., 1992; Jácome and Vázquez, 2008; 
Vuletin and Zhu, 2011). Second, we also consider a transformation used by other scholars 
(Bodea and Hicks, 2015a; Busch and Joumlrgens, 2005; David, 2011; Pervez, 2015). This modified 
inflation rate II consists of using the logged inflation rate as the dependent variable while treating 
negative values similar to the log of the negative inflation rate.13 The data come from the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics. 
Our models include a series of controls. The literature shows the conditioning effect of 
different measures of democracy or rule of law on CBI (Acemoglu et al., 2008; Bodea and Hicks, 
2015a; Fazio et al., 2018). Thus, we include democracy both as a control and interacting with 
CBI. To proxy democracy, our baseline specification includes the Polity2 score, that ranges from 
-10 (total autocracy) to 10 (total democracy) (Marshall and Keith Jaggers, 2012). For robustness 
checks, we also use Freedom House’s (2012) data – the average of a country’s political rights and 
civil liberties score. Lower Freedom House scores indicate more democratic countries.  
Both a country’s exposure to capital movements, and its exchange rate regime affect the 
ability of monetary policy to affect inflation (Fleming, 1962; Mundell, 1961). To account for 
other policy choices that may affect the anti-inflationary effects of CBI, we include Chinn and 
Ito’s (2008) measure of capital account openness. Although most empirical studies of the effect 
of CBI on inflation do not include this variable (Acemoglu et al., 2008; Bodea and Hicks, 2015a), 
developing countries have a wide variance in capital controls (Aizenman, 2018; Aizenman et al., 
2010; Obstfeld et al., 2005; Rey, 2015). We also include Peg, a dichotomous variable indicating a 
fixed exchange rate, based on the de facto exchange rate regime classification by Reinhart & 
Rogoff (2009, 2004).14  
Additionally, we control for Real GDP per capita, Trade openness –the sum of exports and 
imports as a share of GDP, following Daniels, et al. (2005) –, and World Inflation to capture the 
effect of price changes in the rest of the world (Bodea and Hicks, 2015a; Lin and Ye, 2012; 
Neely and Rapach, 2011). World inflation is the median yearly percentage change in the consumer 
                                               
13 Additionally, we conducted a comparison of distributions for all three measures of inflation. Using a 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test based on the kernel densities, we do not reject the hypothesis of equality of 
distribution functions. This provides evidence of the similarity of these measures. Results of these tests are 
not reported here but are available upon request. 
14 Peg equals 1 when there is no separate legal tender, when there is a pre-announced peg or currency board 
arrangement, when there is a pre-announced horizontal band ≤ +/-2%, or when there is a de facto peg.  
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price index of all World Bank reporting countries. These data are from the World Development 
Indicators (World Bank, 2018). Following Aisen and Veiga (2006) and Desai, et al. (2003), we 
control for Political Instability with Banks and Wilson’s (2016) weighted yearly measure of the 
number of assassinations, strikes, guerrilla warfare, major crises, purges, riots, revolutions, and 
anti-government demonstrations.  
To analyze the robustness of our main results, we perform a sensitivity analysis, 
controlling for additional effects. First, countries adopt inflation targeting as a way to increase 
their level of commitment and credibility to pursue a low inflation (Armand, 2017; Ftiti and 
Hichri, 2014; Lin and Ye, 2012, 2009; Mishkin, 2004; Ogrokhina and Rodriguez, 2018; Rose, 
2007). Thus, we include Inflation targeting, a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the central 
bank has an inflation-targeting framework. Second, Acemoglu, et al. (2003) and Aizenman, et al. 
(2010) argue that countries with procyclical fiscal policy tend to experience more output volatility 
and higher inflation.15 We include a measure of fiscal procyclicality (Fiscal cyclicality) based on Li, 
et al. (2011) methodology.16 Third, following Aizenman, et al. (2010) and Bodea and Hicks 
(2015a), we include the interest rate differential between each country’s interest rate and the US 
(Interest rate diff), as a measure of monetary policy autonomy. Finally, we also control for the 
degree of economic slack by including a measure of Output gap. 17 Following the IMF’s WEO 
methodology from De Masi (1997), we use the Hodrick-Prescott filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 
1997) to compute the Output gap, defined as the difference between observed real GDP and the 
trend of real GDP, as a percent of the trend of real GDP. Appendix 3 shows descriptive 
statistics. 
Descriptive data suggest a general correlation between our measure of CBI and inflation. 
Figure 2 plots yearly averages of CBI and inflation in a sample of developing countries, from 
1980 to 2012.18 The quadrants are divided by the sample mean of inflation, and by the middle 
point of the CBI scale. All the higher-than-the-mean inflation observations are in the quadrant of 
                                               
15 From a different perspective, Grainville and Mallick (2006) and Jawadi et al. (2016) also argue about the 
use of fiscal policy with monetary independence. 
16 Fiscal cyclicality comes from an averaged local linear estimator that uses a non-parametric time-varying 
coefficients panel data model between government consumption and output gap with fixed effects. 
17 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.  
18 For this figure, we use the full sample (118 countries, 34 years) and remove eight extreme outliers before 
calculating the yearly average of inflation. The removed outliers are: Bolivia 1985, Congo, DR 1994, Kyrgyz 
Republic 2009, Mauritius 1986, Nicaragua 1988 and 1990, Ukraine 1993, and Zimbabwe 2007. 
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low CBI, whereas the years with lower inflation are in the high-CBI quadrant. One observation 
falls outside of the expected quadrants: 1996 (low CBI, below-the-mean inflation). 
 
 
Figure 2. Correlation between yearly averages of CBI and inflation. Developing countries 
 
 
 
Note:  The horizontal line shows the sample mean for the log of inflation. 
 
Figure 2 suggests a negative relationship between CBI and the inflation rate in 
developing countries. Although suggestive, these data do not control for confounding factors. 
 
3.3 Estimation strategy 
Given the panel structure of the data, where subscripts i and t represent country and time period 
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!*" = 7!*"2, + 9,':)*"+9-;<=*" + 9>':)*" ∗ ;<=*"+@A*"2, + B" + C* + D*"  (1) 
where pit and pit-1 are the measure of inflation rate for country i at time t and t-1, respectively; 
CBIit is our measure of CBI; Demit is a measure of democracy; Xit-1 represents a vector of time-
varying control variables; Bt is a period-specific constant to account for common shocks; Ci is an 
unobserved country-specific effect that captures all time-invariant factors that affect the 
outcome; and Dit is the error term. The inclusion of the interaction term enables the analysis of 
both the direct and indirect effects of CBI and democracy on inflation. 
Our benchmark specification is a dynamic panel model with fixed effects. In this type of 
setup, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable may introduce a bias (Nickell, 1981). As 
Wooldridge (2002) explains, when the number of time-series (T) is small, this problem is 
nontrivial since shocks to fixed effects do not diminish over time. However, when T is at least 30 
– it is 33 in our case – the bias is significantly reduced (Beck and Katz, 2011; Beck et al., 2014).19 
In fact, Beck and Katz (2011) conclude that in such case, regardless of the number of cross-
sectional units, the Nickel bias is trivially small. 
 
4 Results  
Table 1 presents the results for our baseline specification. Column (1) shows the 
unconditional effect of CBI on inflation while column (2) presents our baseline model including 
the interaction between democracy and CBI. In column (1), CBI is negatively associated with 
inflation, suggesting an unconditional relation between CBI and inflation (as in Bodea and Hicks, 
2015a; Loungani and Sheets, 1997). Regarding the control variables, the estimate associated with 
Capital account openness is negative and statistically significant, consistent with Aizenman et al. 
(2010), and Razin and Binyamini (2007). Peg also shows a negative and statistically significant 
effect, as expected  (Aizenman et al., 2010; Bleaney and Fielding, 2002; Ghosh et al., 1997). The 
rest of the controls behave similarly in both models: the lagged dependent variable is positive, 
significant, and predicts about 50% of the variance of the inflation, giving evidence of inertia in 
the inflation rate. Neither GDP per capita nor Trade openness achieve statistical significance. World 
                                               
19 In Beck et al. (2014) for T=40 and N=200 the bias in their point estimate is only -0.01.  
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Inflation is negative and statistically significant.20 Finally, consistent with Aisen and Veiga (2006), 
we find that political instability has a positive relationship with the level of inflation for 
developing countries. These effects of the control variables are consistent across specifications. 
In column (2), although the coefficient associated with CBI is not significant, the 
interaction term and the joint effect appear significant as indicated by the Wald test. The table 
reports the joint effect of CBI and the interaction term at different levels of democracy: 
Polity2=1, the lowest level of democracy for which the joint effect is significant; Polity2=6, the 
cut-point normally used to indicate a democratic regime, and Polity2=10, a full democracy.21 
Additionally, Figure 3 shows the interpretation of the joint effect, the marginal effect of CBI on 
the inflation rate by level of democracy.22 CBI is significantly negatively associated with inflation 
when Polity2 is ≥0, that is, even for most authoritarian regimes. This result differs from previous 
studies that find that CBI curbs inflation but only in democracies (Bodea and Hicks, 2015a) or 
only at some levels of institutional constraints (Acemoglu et al., 2008; Hielscher and Markwardt, 
2012).23 This does not mean that institutional constraints are irrelevant. We find that the negative 
effect of CBI on inflation is stronger in the presence of more democratic institutions.  
 
  
                                               
20 To further understand what lies behind the negative coefficient associated with World Inflation measured 
in t-1, we pursued the following sensitivity analysis. We first considered World Inflation in period t, then in 
periods t and t-1, and finally in periods t, t-1, and t-2. In all cases, our main results hold. Interestingly, we 
find evidence that suggests that the transmission of World inflation to domestic inflation has an overall 
positive relationship but shows cyclical oscillations. Following Arellano and Bond (1991) and Beck and 
Katz (2011), we decided to use one lag of World Inflation in our baseline specification to reduce the potential 
bias associated with endogeneity, and to be consistent with the lag structure of the rest of our control 
variables. To preserve space, we report these robustness checks in Appendix 4. We thank an anonymous 
referee for encouraging this discussion. 
21 The coefficients are the linear combination of CBI and the interaction term, at different levels of Polity2. 
The standard errors associated with these linear combinations are obtained using the delta method. 
22 Operationally, based on equation (1), this implies computing the change of inflation relative to CBI, EF*" E':)*"⁄ = 	9, + 9>;<=*" for each value of democracy (Polity2). 
23 In our sample, more than 65% of the observations have Polity2 scores ≥0. 
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Table 1: Effect of CBI on inflation, 1980-2013.  
Dependent variable: Inflation rate (log)  
Estimation: Fixed Effects with robust standard errors 
 (1) (2) 
CBI  -0.823** -0.552 
 (0.333) (0.357) 
Democracy -0.002 0.021 
 (0.007) (0.014) 
CBI*Democracy  -0.057* 
  (0.033) 
Capital account openness -0.553*** -0.525*** 
 (0.110) (0.111) 
Peg -0.304*** -0.302*** 
 (0.062) (0.061) 
Inflationt-1  0.501*** 0.497*** 
 (0.062) (0.061) 
GDP per capitat-1 0.128 0.111 
 (0.126) (0.129) 
Trade opennesst-1 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
World inflationt-1 -0.046*** -0.045*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
Political instabilityt-1 0.019*** 0.018** 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Effect of CBI   
   at Polity2=1  -0.609* 
  (0.345) 
   at Polity2=6  -0.895** 
  (0.335) 
   at Polity2=10  -1.123*** 
  (0.383) 
R2 0.404 0.405 
N. observations 2241 2241 
N. of countries 108 108 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include a constant term, country and decade fixed 
effects, but we do not report their estimates to preserve space. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Figure 3: Marginal effects of CBI on inflation by level of democracy. 
 
 
Table 2 shows the predicted inflation rates at different levels of CBI, for different levels 
of democracy and exchange rate regimes (fixed and flexible), while keeping all the other variables 
at their observational mean values.24 All point estimates are significant at 95% confidence level. 
The predicted inflation rates for full democracies (Polity2=10) with low CBI (CBI=0.2) are 
10.9% and 14.8% for fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes, respectively. However, the 
predicted inflation rates for full democracies with high CBI (CBI=0.8) are significantly smaller 
(almost half of those figures), 5.6% and 7.5% – for fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes, 
respectively. For instance, in 1995-1996, both Lithuania and Costa Rica were full democracies 
(according to Polity2) with fixed exchange rate regimes. Whereas the Lithuanian central bank 
had little independence (CBI= 0.30), Costa Rica had a highly independent central bank 
(CBI=0.73). In that period, the inflation rate in Lithuania was about 32.14%, while it was 20.3% 
in Costa Rica. These figures are highly consistent with our model predictions.  
 
  
                                               
24 Predicted values from this table use specification from column (2) in Table 1.  
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Table 2: Predicted values of inflation rate for democracies and autocracies, with fixed 
and flexible exchange rates, at different levels of CBI, 1980-2013. 
 
Flexible exchange rate 
 
 
Fixed exchange rate 
Polity2 index 
Autocracy Anocracy Democracy Full democracy 
Polity2 = -7 Polity2 = 0 Polity2 = 6 Polity2 = 10 
Low central bank independence      
CBI = 0.2 9.36  \  12.6   9.96  \  13.4   10.56  \  14.2   10.96  \  14.8   
CBI = 0.3 9.26  \  12.4   9.46  \  12.7   9.66  \  13.0   9.86  \  13.2   
     
Average central bank independence     
CBI = 0.5 8.96  \  12.0   8.56  \  11.5   8.16  \  11.0   7.96  \  10.7   
     
High central bank independence     
CBI = 0.7 8.66  \  11.7   7.56  \  10.2   6.76  \  9.1   6.26  \  8.4   
CBI = 0.8 8.56  \  11.5 7.16  \  9.7   6.26  \  8.3  5.66  \  7.5  
 
Notes: All point estimates are significant at 95% confidence level. Predicted values use specification from column (3) 
in Table 1. All variables are kept at their mean values with the exception of CBI, democracy, and Peg. In each cell, 
the first figure is for fixed exchange rates, and the second for flexible exchange rates. 
 
Interestingly, Table 2 also suggests that in absence of an independent central bank, our 
specification predicts more inflation when countries are more democratic. Holding other things 
constant, for countries with low CBI (CBI=0.2), a movement from autocracies (Polity2=-7) to 
full democracies (Polity2=10) is associated with an increase of 2.2 percentage points in the 
predicted inflation rate (from 12.6% to 14.8%) for flexible exchange rate regimes, and of 1.6 
percentage points (from 9.3% to 10.9%) for fixed exchange rate regimes. However, when central 
banks enjoy higher levels of independence, more democracy is associated with reductions in the 
predicted inflation rate. For example, when CBI=0.8, the difference in predicted inflation rate 
between Polity2=-7 and Polity2=10 is 4.0 percentage points for flexible exchange rate regimes, 
and 2.9 percentage points for fixed exchange rate regimes. These findings are consistent with 
Cukierman et al.’s (2002) study of transition economies, and with a new literature showing that 
CBI has important effects in non-democratic countries (Baerg et al., 2017; Bodea et al., 2019; 
Johnson, 2016). These results also speak to the longstanding debate on the effects of democracy 
on inflation (Desai et al., 2003), with studies showing that democracy is associated with higher 
(Gasiorowski, 2000) or lower (Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu, 2008) inflation rates. Our findings 
suggest that the direction of this effect depends on how independent central banks are, and that 
accounting for CBI may help conciliating these results. 
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4.1 Sensitivity analysis 
This section extends the main results and explores their robustness to alternative model 
specifications and estimation techniques. In all cases, we use our baseline specification.  
Table 3 includes additional controls. Columns (1) and (2) include an indicator for the 
adoption of an inflation-targeting framework. Columns (3) and (4) include Fiscal cyclicality. Columns 
(5) and (6) control for the effect of the US monetary policy on the domestic interest rate (Interest 
rates diff) to capture monetary policy autonomy. Columns (7) and (8) include a measure of Output 
gap that capture the cyclicality of real GDP. Results from columns (1) to (8) are robust and 
consistent with Table 1. From the set of additional regressors, only Inflation targeting has a 
negative significant point estimate (columns (5) and (6)). This confirms previous research on the 
beneficial effects of adopting inflation targeting in developing countries (Lin and Ye, 2009). In 
columns (6) and (8), although the coefficient associated with CBI loses significance, the overall 
effect of CBI becomes significant once the level of democracy (Polity2) is ≥0. 
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Table 3: Effect of CBI on inflation, 1980-2013. Sensitivity analysis: Additional regressors 
Dependent variable: Inflation rate (log)  
Estimation: Fixed Effects with robust standard errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CBI  -0.782** -0.574 -0.881** -0.763** -1.195*** -0.586* -0.857** -0.587 
 (0.330) (0.359) (0.341) (0.337) (0.351) (0.352) (0.337) (0.360) 
Democracy 0.000 0.018 0.002 0.012 -0.015 0.028 -0.003 0.020 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.015) (0.011) (0.020) (0.007) (0.014) 
CBI*Democracy  -0.044  -0.023  -0.101**  -0.057* 
  (0.035)  (0.032)  (0.043)  (0.035) 
Cap. account  -0.530*** -0.510*** -0.620*** -0.608*** -0.715*** -0.672*** -0.547*** -0.518*** 
       Openness (0.111) (0.111) (0.125) (0.124) (0.176) (0.180) (0.114) (0.114) 
Peg -0.355*** -0.350*** -0.245*** -0.242*** -0.193** -0.191** -0.309*** -0.305*** 
 (0.064) (0.063) (0.070) (0.069) (0.091) (0.090) (0.060) (0.059) 
Inflationt-1  0.487*** 0.485*** 0.450*** 0.449*** 0.183*** 0.173** 0.498*** 0.494*** 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.062) (0.062) 
GDP per capitat-1 0.145 0.131 0.240* 0.232* -0.123 -0.156 0.167 0.152 
 (0.129) (0.131) (0.133) (0.131) (0.230) (0.229) (0.139) (0.140) 
Trade opennesst-1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
World inflationt-1 -0.045*** -0.044*** -0.041** -0.041** -0.044* -0.040* -0.044*** -0.043*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.016) (0.016) 
Political  0.017** 0.016** 0.015* 0.015* 0.014* 0.012 0.020*** 0.019*** 
     instabilityt-1 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Inflation  -0.408*** -0.383***       
     targeting (0.138) (0.145)       
Fiscal cyclicality   5.339 5.355     
   (4.464) (4.450)     
Interest rates      -0.042 -0.045   
          differential     (0.059) (0.059)   
Output gap       -0.360 -0.397 
       (0.772) (0.759) 
Effect of CBI         
     at Polity2=1  -0.618*  -0.786**  -0.687**  -0.647* 
  (0.346)  (0.331)  (0.335)  (0.348) 
     at Polity2=6  -0.840***  -0.902***  -1.192***  -0.929*** 
  (0.333)  (0.347)  (0.332)  (0.341) 
     at Polity2=10  -1.018***  -0.995***  -1.597***  1.158*** 
  (0.385)  (0.408)  (0.418)  (0.394) 
R2 0.408 0.409 0.382 0.382 0.194 0.199 0.405 0.407 
N. observations 2241 2241 1744 1744 1286 1286 2204 2204 
N. of countries 108 108 96 96 99 99 108 108 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include a constant term, country and decade fixed 
effects, but we do not report their estimates to preserve space. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Table 4 uses two different measures for inflation, an alternative proxy for democracy, and 
the TOR as a common proxy for de facto CBI. Columns (1) and (2) show the estimates of using 
the modified inflation rate D. The coefficient associated with CBI loses significance but the effect 
of CBI at different levels of democracy remains significant, such that moving from an anocracy 
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(Polity2=1) to a full democracy (Polity2=10) strengthen the effect of CBI on inflation by 3 
percentage points. Columns (3) and (4) show the results with the modified inflation rate II. In this 
case, results are stronger than in our baseline specification. The coefficient associated with CBI is 
now significant and the effect of CBI at different levels of democracy is slightly stronger than 
column (3) in Table 1. Shifting from an anocracy (Polity2=1) to a full democracy (Polity2=10) 
strengthen the effect of CBI on inflation by 14 percentage points.25 In this regard, our baseline 
specification is a conservative estimation of the effect of CBI on inflation.   
Columns (5) and (6) present the results using Freedom House scores as an alternative 
measure of democracy. Although different in their methodology and construction, the 
correlation between Polity2 and Freedom House is high, almost 0.85.26 As expected, our main 
results hold when using this alternative measure of democracy.27 
  
                                               
25 The 14 percentage point reduction is the difference between computing the effect of CBI at Polity2=1 
(a reduction in inflation by a factor of 0.43, that is by 0.57), and the effect of CBI at Polity2=10 (a reduction 
in inflation by a factor of 0.29, that is by 0.71).  
26 The Freedom House index has a reversed scale relative to Polity2. In our regressions, we reverse the scale 
for comparison purposes. Additionally, relative to Polity2, the Freedom House index has a smaller variance 
and includes more countries.  
27 Figure A5.1 in appendix 5 shows that the general negative relationship between CBI and inflation is 
robust to the inclusion of additional controls, and to the use of different measures for inflation and 
democracy. 
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Table 4: Effect of CBI on inflation, 1980-2013. Sensitivity analysis: Alternative measures 
for dependent and main independent variables 
Dependent variable: Inflation rate (log)  
Estimation: Fixed Effects with robust standard errors 
 
 Modified inflation       
rate D 
Modified inflation rate II Freedom House TOR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CBI  -0.078** -0.063 -1.003*** -0.792** -0.755** -1.289** 0.703*** 
 (0.037) (0.041) (0.363) (0.392) (0.319) (0.559) (0.187) 
Democracy -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.018 0.012 -0.057 -0.011* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.015) (0.027) (0.061) (0.006) 
CBI*Democracy  -0.003  -0.047  0.161  
  (0.004)  (0.037)  (0.137)  
Cap. account  -0.051*** -0.049*** -0.719*** -0.694*** -0.537*** -0.523*** -0.506*** 
       Openness (0.013) (0.013) (0.128) (0.128) (0.108) (0.109) (0.120) 
Peg -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.294*** -0.292*** -0.273*** -0.271*** -0.243*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.069) (0.069) (0.064) (0.063) (0.069) 
Inflationt-1  0.653*** 0.652*** 0.421*** 0.419*** 0.490*** 0.487*** 0.387*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.056) (0.055) (0.060) (0.059) (0.085) 
GDP per capitat-1 0.040** 0.039** 0.188 0.172 0.152 0.158 0.131 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.162) (0.164) (0.126) (0.130) (0.137) 
Trade opennesst-1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
World inflationt-1 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.036** -0.035** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.017 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
Political  0.002** 0.002** 0.012* 0.011 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.018** 
     instabilityt-1 (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Effect of CBI        
   at Polity2=1/FH=4  -0.066*  -0.838**  -0.645**  
  (0.039)  (0.379)  (0.329)  
   at Polity2=6/FH=2  -0.084***  -1.071***  -0.967***  
  (0.036)  (0.366)  (0.367)  
   at 
Polity2=10/FH=1  -0.097***  -1.257***  -1.128*** 
 
  (0.040)  (0.421)  (0.452)  
R2 0.567 0.567 0.325 0.325 0.381 0.382 0.320 
N. observations 2392 2392 2384 2384 2349 2349 2274 
N. of countries 108 108 108 108 116 116 101 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include a constant term, country and decade fixed 
effects, but we do not report their estimates to preserve space. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Our results contrast with previous studies that failed to find a statistically significant 
association between legal CBI and inflation in developing countries. To reduce concerns 
regarding our results being an artifact of the sample and/or model specification used in this 
study, column (7) in Table 4 replaces our measure of legal CBI with a de facto measure, the TOR 
(data from Dreher et al., 2008). The TOR is also used as a proxy for CBI in developing 
countries, and is generally correlated with inflation (Cukierman, 1992; de Haan and Kooi, 2000; 
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Ftiti et al., 2017; Klomp and de Haan, 2010b; Posso and Tawadros, 2013).28 The positive 
coefficient indicates that higher turnover rates (less independence) are associated with higher 
inflation. This suggests that our sample and model specification provide results consistent with 
this previous literature. Furthermore, these results suggest that legal CBI conditioned by 
democracy might be a reasonable proxy for actual CBI.  
Our results are also robust to alternative estimation methodologies. Given the panel 
structure of our data, we first remove the lagged dependent variable and estimate equation (1) 
using fixed effects as suggested by Klomp and de Haan (2010b). The methodological drawback 
is that point estimates are less precise since the variance tends to be higher – due to a 
specification error – when omitting the lag (Mizon, 1995). Second, given that the inclusion of 
lagged independent variables may not eliminate all potential endogeneity and reverse causation 
concerns associated with CBI, we perform an instrumental variable (IV) approach where CBI is 
an endogenous variable. Bodea and Hicks (2015b) find that CBI is mostly driven by regional 
diffusion. Thus, we use the regional average of CBI as instrument, because it influences a 
country’s individual CBI, but it is unlikely to affect a country’s inflation rate.29 Since our baseline 
specification has an interaction term, we also use the interaction between the regional average of 
CBI and the level of democracy (as suggested by Wooldridge, 2002) as an additional instrument. 
Third, an alternative way to avoid Nickell bias is to use GMM dynamic panel data estimators 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). This approach 
addresses the issues of joint endogeneity of all explanatory variables in a dynamic formulation, 
and reduces potential biases induced by fixed effects. However, Roodman (2009) warns that the 
instrument count can easily grow large relative to the sample size. This can potentially overfit 
endogenous variables, failing to purge their endogenous components and biasing estimates. 
Finally, to filter out business cycle fluctuations from our annual data and focus on the long run 
effects, we follow Barro (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) and measure our variables as 
5-year averages.30  
                                               
28 Notice that Dreher et al. (2010, 2008) find that central bankers who fail to control inflation tend to be 
replaced more often, and argue that the TOR is endogenous to inflation. 
29 Operationally, this implies computing a regional average of CBI for each country i (excluding country i). 
The correlation between the regional average CBI and a country’s individual CBI is 0.56. 
30 This approach, frequently used in the growth literature, enables us to focus on changes that require 
more time to process. We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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Table 5 presents the results for alternative methodologies. In all cases, our results are 
qualitatively similar to those found in in Table 1. The negative coefficient associated with CBI, 
and the effect of CBI at different levels of democracy, are significant across methodologies. For 
columns (3) and (4), the joint F-statistics of the first stage of the IV regressions show that the 
instruments are relevant and greater that Staiger and Stock’s (1997) rule of thumb of 10. For 
columns (5) and (6), we use the Hansen J test of overidentifying restrictions and a test of second 
order serial correlation of the residuals. Both tests are rejected. Thus, the validity of the 
instruments cannot be rejected. Finally, in columns (7) and (8), when using five-year averages of 
our variables, our sample is significantly smaller (approximately 20% of the observations we have 
in our baseline specification). Interestingly, our results remain intact, with similar point estimates, 
and the same level of significance. 
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Table 5: Effect of CBI on inflation, 1980-2013. Alternative methodologies 
Dependent variable: Inflation rate (log)  
 
Estimation FE without lagged DV Instrumental Variables Dynamic GMM 5-year Averages 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CBI  -1.363** -0.918* -2.315*** -1.800** -1.647*** -1.436** -1.108** -0.833 
 (0.564) (0.538) (0.550) (0.900) (0.606) (0.642) (0.516) (0.553) 
Democracy 0.002 0.041* 0.005 0.029 0.006 0.039 0.005 0.030 
 (0.010) (0.021) (0.006) (0.027) (0.007) (0.050) (0.015) (0.022) 
CBI*Democracy  -0.096*  -0.061  -0.076  -0.063 
  (0.052)  (0.072)  (0.109)  (0.055) 
Cap. account  -1.071*** -1.016*** -0.555*** -0.525*** -0.149 -0.103 -0.926*** -0.882*** 
        Openness (0.233) (0.225) (0.094) (0.104) (0.194) (0.227) (0.241) (0.236) 
Peg -0.435*** -0.431*** -0.306*** -0.303*** -0.318*** -0.325*** -0.436*** -0.435*** 
 (0.102) (0.100) (0.050) (0.050) (0.084) (0.088) (0.145) (0.145) 
Inflationt-1    0.481*** 0.479*** 0.620*** 0.606*** 0.250*** 0.246*** 
   (0.042) (0.041) (0.071) (0.075) (0.042) (0.043) 
GDP per capitat-1 0.013 -0.018 0.166 0.139 0.191** 0.203** 0.375 0.345 
 (0.187) (0.188) (0.117) (0.121) (0.088) (0.092) (0.281) (0.288) 
Trade opennesst-1 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
World inflationt-1 -0.000 0.001 -0.047*** -0.046*** -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.183*** -0.183*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.027) (0.027) 
Political  0.031*** 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.023*** -0.014 -0.015 0.080*** 0.076*** 
     instabilityt-1 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.025) (0.025) (0.019) (0.019) 
Effect of CBI         
    at Polity2=1  -1.014*  -1.860**  -1.512**  -0.896* 
  (0.531)  (0.843)  (0.619)  (0.533) 
     at Polity2=6  -1.492***  -2.163***  -1.892***  -1.208** 
  (0.575)  (0.609)  (0.774)  (0.521) 
     at Polity2=10  -1.875***  -2.405***  -2.196**  -1.459*** 
  (0.683)  (0.533)  (1.096)  (0.606) 
R2 0.216 0.221     0.425 0.427 
N. observations 2326 2326 2144 2144 2241 2241 484 484 
N. of countries 108 108 106 106 108 108 106 106 
First-stage reg.         
CBI regional    1.036*** 4.519***     
   (0.071) (0.656)     
CBI regional    0.702***     
      *Democracy    (0.058)     
F-Statistic   212.32 74.33     
Specification tests (p-
values)         
        
Hansen test     0.563 0.579   
Second order  
 serial correlation 
    0.165 0.181   
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include a constant term, country and decade fixed 
effects, but we do not report their estimates to preserve space. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Columns (5) and (6) 
use the two-step system GMM estimator with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust correction. 
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4.1.1 Other robustness tests 
Tables 1 to 5 provide strong support for the existence of a negative relationship between CBI 
and inflation. These findings are not sensitive to different model specifications, measurement 
choices, or estimation techniques. To analyze further the robustness of our main findings, we 
conducted additional tests altering the sample for the analyses and found that our results are 
indeed robust. Below, we summarize the results and present in Tables A5.1 to A5.6 (Appendix 5) 
the details of the tests. 
Influence of outliers: Although the transformations of the inflation rate presented in the 
previous subsection reduces the impact of outliers on our results, we conduct additional tests to 
minimize concerns about outliers. First, we use a jackknife estimation of our main specification. 
That is, the analysis is performed in subsamples omitting one country at a time, and then 
aggregating the estimates. Second, we exclude countries that experienced hyperinflations during 
the period covered in our sample.31 Finally, we include a dummy variable identifying high 
inflation observations (Alpanda and Honig, 2014). In all cases, our main results remain stable 
and significant. 
Regional influences: We analyze if our results change by systematically omitting subgroups of 
countries. Other studies find similar effects for subregional samples (Cukierman, 1992; Jácome 
and Vázquez, 2008). Our results are robust in subsamples that omit one continent or 
subcontinent at a time.  
Level of democracy: We analyze our results in different regime types. For this, we use the 
Polity2 score to create four groups: (i) autocracies (Polity2 between -10 and -6), (ii) closed 
anocracies (Polity2 between -5 and 0), (iii) open anocracies (Polity2 between 1 and 5), and (iv) 
democracies (Polity2 between 6 to 10).32 Our results hold in the last three subgroups. This is 
consistent with our main results, and confirms that CBI does not have significant anti-
inflationary effects in very autocratic countries.  
Income groups: We analyze our results by income group. Our main results remain stable and 
significant for lower-middle and upper-middle income countries (67 out of the 101 countries 
from our sample). However, they become insignificant for low and high-income countries. This 
                                               
31 These countries are Angola, Argentina, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Congo (DR), Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe. 
32 These are regimes that combine characteristics of autocracies and of democracies, such as some level of 
political competition (Schmidt, 2016; Vreeland, 2008)(Schmidt, 2016; Vreeland, 2008). 
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is not surprising since these two subgroups only include 22 and 12 countries, respectively, 
affecting the standard errors of our regressions.  
Different time windows: Following Dreher et al. (2010), we considered shorter periods for our 
analysis. Results hold when we exclude the 1980s (1990-2013) and the years after the global 
financial crisis (1980-2006). 
Exclusion of crises: There is compelling evidence of the difficulties monetary authorities have 
to control inflation in the face of shocks (Granville and Mallick, 2010; Holtemöller and Mallick, 
2016; Mallick and Sousa, 2011). In this case, we analyze the consistency of our results removing 
the episodes of banking, currency, and debt crises. Additionally, we construct a measure of 
occurrence of any of these crises. Our results hold in all cases. 
 
4.2 Analysis by components 
CBI is frequently measured using composite indices (Alesina et al., 1989; Cukierman, 1992; Grilli 
et al., 1991). When weighted indices measure variables of interest, three main concerns regarding 
the validity of the scores produced arise: conceptualization, measurement, and aggregation 
(Munck and Verkuilen, 2002; Treier and Jackman, 2008). In this section, we examine whether the 
use of the weighted index conflates dimensions of CBI that are related with inflation, with others 
that are not – the aggregation concern. In other words, we analyze whether some of the index’s 
components are driving our results.  
In particular, we examine whether all four dimensions of CBI, measured following 
Cukierman et al.’s (1992) rules, are associated with lower inflation rates, or if the aggregate index 
performs better than its components.33 In doing so, this analysis has implications for the 
conceptualization of CBI, and for policies designed to implement it. On the one hand, it is 
important to assess the relevance of the components included in the definition – and 
consequently, the measurement – of CBI. On the other hand, the analysis by components sheds 
                                               
33 We are aware that authors like Banaian, et al.(1998) and Bagheri and Habibi (1998, p. 193) have challenged 
the relevance of the variables included in the Cukierman et al. (1992) index. However, this criticism relies 
on the empirical properties of those components for statistical analyses, but not on their theoretical 
foundations. 
 26 
light on what dimensions of CBI may be more effective at fighting inflation in developing 
countries. 
Thus, we disaggregate our CBI index in its four main components (dimensions): stability 
of the chief executive officer of the bank (personnel independence), central bank objectives, 
independence in policy formulation, and limitations on lending to the public sector (financial 
independence). Each component ranges from 0 to 1 and has a fixed weight in the aggregate CBI 
index.34 The correlation between the aggregate (weighted) CBI index and its four components in 
our sample is 0.60 (personnel), 0.59 (objectives), 0.74 (policy), and 0.90 (financial). The 
components are not highly correlated among them – the only exception is the 0.49 correlation 
between policy and financial independence. We replicate our baseline specification substituting 
the CBI index by each of these components. Table 6 shows the results. 
 
  
                                               
34 Appendix 1 lists the variables included in each component, and their weights. 
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Table 6: Effect of CBI on inflation, 1980-2013. Components of CBI 
Dependent variable: Inflation rate (log)  
Estimation: Fixed Effects with robust standard errors 
 
 Personnel independence  (20%)† 
CB objectives  
(15%)† 
Policy independence  
(15%)† 
Financial independence  
(50%)† 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CBI  -0.595* -0.489 -0.688*** -0.593** -0.256 -0.088 -0.415* -0.215* 
 (0.345) (0.347) (0.244) (0.237) (0.177) (0.162) (0.224) (0.254) 
Democracy -0.005 0.017 -0.004 0.009 -0.005 0.010 -0.001 0.014 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) 
CBI*Democracy  -0.044  -0.030  -0.042**  -0.041 
  (0.035)  (0.020)  (0.017)  (0.024) 
Cap. account  -0.585*** -0.592*** -0.525*** -0.520*** -0.543*** -0.529*** -0.569*** -0.536*** 
     openness (0.122) (0.123) (0.109) (0.109) (0.116) (0.115) (0.112) (0.113) 
Peg -0.307*** -0.304*** -0.316*** -0.319*** -0.300*** -0.295*** -0.313*** -0.312*** 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) (0.063) (0.062) (0.063) (0.062) 
Inflationt-1  0.504*** 0.500*** 0.501*** 0.497*** 0.508*** 0.503*** 0.495*** 0.493*** 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) 
GDP per capitat-1 0.088 0.090 0.080 0.076 0.113 0.115 0.002 -0.030 
 (0.127) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.128) (0.122) (0.133) (0.132) 
Trade opennesst-1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
World inflationt-1 -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.044*** -0.043*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Political  0.018*** 0.017** 0.016** 0.015** 0.019*** 0.018** 0.020*** 0.019*** 
     instabilityt-1 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Effect of CBI         
   at Polity2=1  -0.533  -0.623***  -0.129  -0.255 
  (0.338)  (0.238)  (0.164)  (0.244) 
   at Polity2=4  -.666**  -0.713***  -0.255  -0.377* 
  (0.333)  (0.250)  (0.178)  (0. 228) 
   at Polity2=6  -0.753**  -0.774***  -0.338*  -0.458** 
  (0.347)  (0.265)  (0.194)  (0.230) 
   at Polity2=10  -0.930**  -0.894***  -0.506**  -0.619** 
  (0.413)  (0.311)  (0.239)  (0.262) 
R2 0.401 0.401 0.407 0.408 0.400 0.402 0.395 0.396 
N. observations 2241 2241 2226 2226 2241 2241 2232 2232 
N. of countries 108 108 107 107 108 108 108 108 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include a constant term, country and decade fixed 
effects, but we do not report their estimates to preserve space. *p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
† This percentage indicates the weight of this component in the aggregate (weighted) CBI index. 
 
The coefficients associated with all the CBI components are negative, but not all of them 
are significant. In column (3), the coefficient for central bank objectives is strongly significant, 
while in columns (1) and (7) those of personnel and financial independence are marginally 
significant. However, when the effect of democracy is accounted for – in columns (2), (4), (6), 
and (8) – a clearer picture emerges. Figure 4 shows these marginal effects. Policy and financial 
independence are significantly associated with lower inflation rates in democracies (CBI is 
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negative and significant at 95% confidence level when Polity2=8 and Polity2=6, respectively), 
while personnel independence and central bank objectives are significant even in anocracies 
(Polity2=4 and Polity2=-3, respectively).  
 
Figure 4: Marginal effects of CBI on inflation. Analysis by components. 
 
 
Furthermore, the effects are sizeable. From column (3) in Table 1, for a fully democratic 
developing country (Polity2=10), a shift from a dependent central bank to an independent bank 
is associated with a 67.5% decrease in the inflation rate.35 For the median annual inflation rate in 
our sample (8.56%), this would represent a 6.0 percentage point reduction.36 From columns (2), 
                                               
35 Cape Verde (2002-2012), Chile (2006-2009), Costa Rica (1978-2012), Cyprus (2002-2007), Israel (1999-
2009), Jamaica (1978-1992), Mauritius (2004-2012), Mongolia (1996-2012), Trinidad and Tobago (1997-
2012), and Uruguay (1989-2012) are examples of developing countries scoring 10 in Polity2 in our sample.  
36 We get very similar effects if we use the sample mean instead of the median. 
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(4), (6), and (8) in Table 6, the impacts on the inflation rate of a shift from a dependent central 
bank to an independent one, for each of the components are as follow: Personnel independence 
is associated with a 60.5% decrease (5.1 percentage points); central bank objectives, policy 
independence, and financial independence with 59.1% (5.0 percentage points), 39.7% (3.4 
percentage points) and 46.2% (3.9 percentage points) decreases, respectively.  
For the purposes of our sensitivity analysis, these results suggest that a single dimension of 
the index does not drive the effect of CBI on inflation in developing countries, and none of 
them seem completely unrelated to inflation. In fact, each dimension may have different effects 
depending on the institutional context in which the central bank operates. For example, in non-
democratic contexts, setting price stability as the main objective of the central bank, and 
provisions regarding appointment and tenure of the central bankers are associated with lower 
inflation in authoritarian regimes (this effect is significant when Polity2≥ – 3 and Polity2≥ 4, 
respectively). Interestingly, legal limits to the ability of the government to borrow from the 
central bank, and to intervene in monetary policy (financial and policy independence, 
respectively), only seem to be associated with lower inflation in democratic countries.37 
 
5 Concluding remarks  
One of the main motivations to grant independence to central banks is the need to avoid 
political pressures to pursue expansionary policies that cause inflation. Although the negative 
relationship between CBI and inflation is widely documented for developed countries, the 
evidence for developing countries is scarce and partial. Yet, recent studies suggest that evidence 
obtained in smaller and non-representative samples could be affected by selection bias (Garriga, 
2016). Our study builds on this empirical literature to examine the effectiveness of legal CBI as 
an anti-inflationary tool on a broad panel of developing countries. The span of our sample – 118 
developing countries between 1980 and 2013 – gives us confidence that selection of cases or 
choices regarding periodization are not affecting out results. 
We provide robust evidence of the inflation curbing effects of legal CBI under different 
institutional contexts. Although democratic constraints enhance the anti-inflationary effects of 
                                               
37  These results open other questions for further research. Here, we interpret the results within the 
framework of our concerns about the sensitivity of our main results.  
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CBI, these effects are also robust and sizeable also in non-democratic countries. This opens 
avenues for further research of the mechanisms that make independent central banks effective 
even in countries with weak political constraints. As research suggests, it is possible that de jure 
protections to central bankers are effective in non-democratic regimes because they reflect other 
kinds of power-sharing agreements among authoritarian elites (Baerg et al., 2017), because 
authoritarian regimes have (weaker but effective) political constraints (Bodea et al., 2019), 
because of autocrats’ preferences regarding international markets confidence (Maxfield, 1997), or 
the country’s future political direction (Boylan, 1998), or because of the diffusion of norms that 
make CBI effective even in non-democracies (Johnson, 2016, 2006).38 
Our analysis reinforces the importance of the independence of the central bank as an 
effective mechanism to reduce the inflation, but not as the only one. Capital account openness, 
fixed exchange rate, and the adoption of inflation targeting are associated with lower inflation as 
well. Yet, our results suggest that the effect of CBI on price stability subsists after controlling for 
these other policies, and it is stronger in the presence of floating exchange rates regimes. 
Finally, our analysis shows that a single dimension of our index of CBI does not drive its 
effect on inflation. This has important conceptual implications when studying the channels 
through which CBI affects price stability and other key outcomes. However, further research is 
still required to understand fully how different aspects of CBI affect the relationships between 
central banks and governments, and how other market actors may be affected.  
The main results and implications from this study contribute to the discussion on the 
effects of granting independence to central banks. Overall, using a very broad sample of 
developing countries, we provide strong evidence that legal protection to central banks for the 
conduction of monetary policy is associated with lower inflation in developing countries. 
Furthermore, this result is conditional on the strength of other political constraints associated 
with the level of democracy in place.  
 
  
                                               
38 Determining the mechanisms that make CBI effective in autocracies exceeds the purposes of this study. 
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Appendix 1. Summary of Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) coding and weighing rules 
Dimension  Components (weight in the index) Variables (weight in the component) Categories 
Personnel 
independence 
CEO (0.20) 1. Term of office of CEO (0.25) 5 
2. Who appoints the CEO (0.25) 5 
3. Provisions for dismissal of CEO (0.25) 7 
4. CEO allowed to hold another office in government (0.25) 2 
Central bank 
objectives 
Objectives (0.15) 5. Central Bank objectives (1) 6 
Policy 
independence 
Policy formulation  
(0.15) 
6. Who formulates monetary policy (0.25) 4 
7. Government directives and resolution of conflicts (0.50) 6 
8. Central Bank given active role in formulation of government’s budget (0.25) 2 
Financial 
independence 
Limitation on lending to the 
government (0.50) 
9. Limitations on advances (0.30) 4 
10. Limitations on securitized lending (0.20) 4 
11. Who decides control of terms of lending to government (0.20) 4 
12. Beneficiaries of Central Bank lending (0.10) 4 
13. Type of limits when they exist (0.05) 4 
14. Maturity of loans (0.05) 4 
15. Restrictions on interest rates (0.05) 5 
16. Prohibition on Central Bank lending in primary market to Government (0.05) 2 
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Appendix 2. Countries included in the analyses  
Albania  Ecuador  Lesotho  Qatar 
Algeria Egypt, Arab Rep.  Liberia Russian Federation 
Angola El Salvador Libya Rwanda 
Argentina Estonia Lithuania Samoa 
Armenia Ethiopia Macedonia, FYR Saudi Arabia 
Azerbaijan Fiji Madagascar Seychelles 
Bahamas, The Gambia, The Malawi Sierra Leone 
Bahrain Georgia Malaysia Slovak Republic 
Bangladesh Ghana Maldives Slovenia  
Barbados Guatemala Malta Solomon Islands 
Belarus Guinea Mauritania South Africa 
Belize Guyana Mauritius Sri Lanka 
Bhutan Haiti Mexico Sudan 
Bolivia Honduras Moldova Suriname 
Botswana Hungary Mongolia Tajikistan 
Brazil India Montenegro Tanzania 
Bulgaria Indonesia Morocco Thailand 
Burundi Iran, Islamic Rep. Mozambique Tonga 
Cape Verde Iraq Myanmar Trinidad and Tobago 
Cambodia Israel Namibia Tunisia 
Chile Jamaica Nepal Uganda 
China Jordan Nicaragua Ukraine 
Colombia Kazakhstan Nigeria Uruguay 
Comoros Kenya Oman Venezuela, RB 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  Korea, Rep. Pakistan Vietnam 
Costa Rica Kuwait Panama Yemen, Rep. 
Croatia Kyrgyz Republic Paraguay Zambia 
Cyprus Lao PDR Peru Zimbabwe 
Djibouti Latvia Philippines  
Dominican Republic Lebanon Poland  
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Appendix 3. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Inflation rate (log) 2,494 2.143 1.338 -6.932 11.101 
CBI 2,580 0.492 0.190 0.135 0.904 
CBI component: Personnel 2,580 0.513 0.193 0.000 1.000 
CBI component: Objectives 2,563 0.507 0.248 0.000 1.000 
CBI component: Policy 2,580 0.453 0. 319 0.000 1.000 
CBI component: Financial 2,564 0.490 0.244 0.013 1.000 
Democracy (Polity2) 2,433 2.563 6.405 -10 10 
Democracy (Freedom House) 2,538 3.772 1.680 1 7 
Peg 2,580 0.622 0.485 0.000 1.000 
Capital account openness 2,539 0.414 0.343 0.000 1.000 
GDP per capita (log) 2,579 7.893 1.155 5.390 11.194 
Trade openness 2,576 75.839 38.754 0.167 311.356 
World inflation 2,540 5.780 2.494 2.784 12.738 
Political instability (log) 2,580 3.493 3.589 0.000 11.358 
Fiscal cyclicality 1,974 0.0003 0.006 -0.141 0.163 
Interest rate differential 1,494 -3.018 1.262 -9.484 7.018 
Inflation targeting 2,580 0.060 0.238 0.000 1.000 
Output gap 2,540 -0.001 0.029 -0.500 0.271 
Modified inflation rate D 2,580 0.117 0.159 -0.594 0.998 
Modified inflation rate II 2,576 2.074 1.387 -6.932 11.101 
Regional CBI (IV analysis) 2,469 0.511 0.110 0.0264 0.753 
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Appendix 4. Changes in the lag structure of World Inflation 
Table A4.1: Effect of CBI on inflation, 1980-2013. World inflation analysis. 
Dependent variable: Inflation rate (log)  
Estimation: Fixed Effects with robust standard errors 
 No lag Baseline model  (as in Table 1) 
Contemporaneous  
and one lag 
Contemporaneous  
and two lags 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
World inflationt 0.069*** 0.070***   0.126*** 0.127*** 0.126*** 0.127*** 
 (0.010) (0.010)   (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
World inflationt-1   -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.110*** -0.109*** -0.129*** -0.128*** 
   (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.024) (0.023) 
World inflationt-2       0.032** 0.031** 
       (0.015) (0.015) 
CBI  -0.711** -0.408 -0.823** -0.552 -0.700** -0.389 -0.751** -0.433 
 (0.334) (0.367) (0.333) (0.357) (0.330) (0.366) (0.340) (0.376) 
Democracy 0.004 0.030** -0.002 0.021 0.001 0.028* 0.002 0.030* 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.016) 
CBI*Democracy  -0.063*  -0.057*  -0.066*  -0.068* 
  (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.035)  (0.037) 
Cap. account  -0.552*** -0.521*** -0.553*** -0.525*** -0.573*** -0.540*** -0.588*** -0.555*** 
       openness (0.111) (0.111) (0.110) (0.111) (0.116) (0.116) (0.124) (0.124) 
Peg -0.322*** -0.320*** -0.304*** -0.302*** -0.303*** -0.299*** -0.310*** -0.304*** 
 (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) 
Inflationt-1  0.477*** 0.473*** 0.501*** 0.497*** 0.487*** 0.483*** 0.486*** 0.481*** 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.062) (0.061) (0.063) (0.062) (0.063) (0.062) 
GDP per capitat-1 0.004 -0.016 0.128 0.111 0.154 0.135 0.243 0.225 
 (0.118) (0.122) (0.126) (0.129) (0.131) (0.134) (0.148) (0.150) 
Trade opennesst-1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Political  0.021*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.018** 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 
     instabilityt-1 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
R2 0.417 0.419 0.417 0.419 0.433 0.435 0.434 0.435 
N. observations 2273 2273 2273 2273 2204 2204 2129 2129 
N. of countries 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include a constant term, country and decade fixed effects, but we do not report their estimates to preserve 
space. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix 5 Other sensitivity analyses 
 
Figure A5.1: Marginal effects of CBI on inflation. Sensitivity analyses. 
 
Note: These figures plot the results of the interactions shown in Tables 3 and 4.  
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Table A5.1: Effect of CBI on inflation, 1980-2013. Additional Robustness Checks: Outliers 
Dependent variable: Inflation rate (log)  
Estimation: Fixed Effects with robust standard errors 
 Jackknife High inflation dummy No-high inflation countries# 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CBI  -0.823** -0.552 -0.712*** -0.548** -0.741** -0.623* 
 (0.355) (0.389) (0.259) (0.263) (0.329) (0.329) 
Democracy -0.002 0.021 -0.006 0.008 0.002 0.012 
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.006) (0.013) (0.006) (0.015) 
CBI*Democracy  -0.057  -0.035  -0.024 
  (0.037)  (0.029)  (0.032) 
Cap. account  -0.553*** -0.525*** -0.491*** -0.475*** -0.535*** -0.523*** 
       openness (0.117) (0.117) (0.090) (0.090) (0.130) (0.129) 
Peg -0.304*** -0.302*** -0.244*** -0.243*** -0.228*** -0.228*** 
 (0.065) (0.064) (0.055) (0.054) (0.062) (0.061) 
Inflationt-1  0.501*** 0.497*** 0.327*** 0.326*** 0.332*** 0.331*** 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.047) (0.047) (0.061) (0.061) 
GDP per capitat-1 0.128 0.111 0.091 0.080 0.001 -0.011 
 (0.138) (0.144) (0.128) (0.130) (0.138) (0.134) 
Trade opennesst-1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
World inflationt-1 -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.020 -0.020 -0.018 -0.018 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) 
Political  0.019*** 0.018** 0.327*** 0.326*** 0.016** 0.016** 
     instabilityt-1 (0.007) (0.007) (0.047) (0.047) (0.007) (0.007) 
High inflation   2.577*** 2.568***   
   (0.202) (0.201)   
Effect of CBI       
   at Polity2=1  -0.601  -0.583**  -0.647** 
  (0.375)  (0.255)  (0.323) 
   at Polity2=3  -0.723**  -0.652***  -0.695** 
  (0.358)  (0.252)  (0.321) 
   at Polity2=6  -0.894***  -0.756***  -0.766** 
  (0.360)  (0.269)  (0.342) 
   at Polity2=10  -1.123***  -0.895***  -0.862** 
  (0.411)  (0.328)  (0.405) 
R2 0.404 0.405 0.507 0.508 0.271 0.271 
N. observations 2241 2241 2241 2241 2015 2015 
N. of countries 108 108 108 108 100 100 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include a constant term, country and decade fixed effects, 
but we do not report their estimates to preserve space. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
# Excluded countries are: Angola, Argentina, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Congo, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe. 
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Table A5.2: Effect of CBI on inflation, 1980-2013. Additional Robustness Checks: Omitted 
Continents 
Dependent variable: Inflation rate (log)  
Estimation: Fixed Effects with robust standard errors 
Omitted continent Eastern Europe Caribbean & Central 
America 
South America 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CBI  -0.950*** -0.840*** -0.591** -0.410 -0.413 -0.323 
 (0.283) (0.281) (0.268) (0.273) (0.271) (0.293) 
Democracy -0.003 0.006 -0.006 0.011 -0.007 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.016) 
CBI*Democracy  -0.023  -0.041  -0.028 
  (0.028)  (0.031)  (0.034) 
Cap. account  -0.479*** -0.466*** -0.605*** -0.595*** -0.313*** -0.300*** 
       openness (0.091) (0.091) (0.122) (0.122) (0.079) (0.078) 
Peg -0.231*** -0.232*** -0.205*** -0.205*** -0.245*** -0.242*** 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.064) (0.063) 
Inflationt-1  0.363*** 0.362*** 0.317*** 0.314*** 0.252*** 0.252*** 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
GDP per capitat-1 0.044 0.035 0.079 0.071 0.068 0.057 
 (0.143) (0.146) (0.136) (0.139) (0.146) (0.147) 
Trade opennesst-1 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
World inflationt-1 -0.012 -0.011 -0.017 -0.016 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Political  0.017** 0.016** 0.015** 0.014** 0.010 0.010 
     instabilityt-1 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Effect of CBI       
   at Polity2=1  -0.863***  -0.451*  -0.350 
  (0.275)  (0.266)  (0.282) 
   at Polity2=3  -0.908***  -0.533**  -0.406 
  (0.273)  (0.263)  (0.271) 
   at Polity2=6  -0.977***  -0.656**  -0.488* 
  (0.291)  (0.285)  (0.286) 
   at Polity2=10  -1.068***  -0.821****  -0.599* 
  (0.348)  (0.351)  (0.354) 
R2 0.552 0.552 0.493 0.494 0.368 0.369 
N. observations 1954 1954 1935 1935 1882 1882 
N. of countries 87 87 97 97 96 96 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include a constant term, country and decade fixed effects, 
but we do not report their estimates to preserve space. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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Table A5.2 (cont.): Effect of CBI on inflation, 1980-2013. Additional Robustness Checks: 
Omitted Continents 
Dependent variable: Inflation rate (log)  
Estimation: Fixed Effects with robust standard errors 
Omitted continent North Africa and Middle 
East 
Sub-Saharan Africa  Asia 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
CBI  -0.690** -0.507 -0.793*** -0.611** -0.686** -0.480* 
 (0.273) (0.306) (0.268) (0.267) (0.292) (0.282) 
Democracy -0.005 0.009 -0.004 0.010 -0.011 0.007 
 (0.006) (0.014) (0.006) (0.015) (0.007) (0.014) 
CBI*Democracy  -0.034  -0.036  -0.041 
  (0.033)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
Cap. account  -0.520*** -0.503*** -0.480*** -0.459*** -0.559*** -0.543*** 
       openness (0.102) (0.103) (0.092) (0.093) (0.102) (0.102) 
Peg -0.255*** -0.254*** -0.256*** -0.256*** -0.294*** -0.290*** 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.068) (0.067) (0.061) (0.061) 
Inflationt-1  0.324*** 0.323*** 0.346*** 0.344*** 0.336*** 0.334*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
GDP per capitat-1 0.139 0.130 0.021 -0.004 0.202 0.209 
 (0.128) (0.130) (0.120) (0.115) (0.162) (0.163) 
Trade opennesst-1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
World inflationt-1 -0.026* -0.025* -0.029** -0.028* -0.033** -0.033** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Political  0.011 0.010 0.013* 0.012* 0.014* 0.013* 
     instabilityt-1 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Effect of CBI       
   at Polity2=1  -0.542*  -0.646***  -0.521* 
  (0.293)  (0.260)  (0.276) 
   at Polity2=3  -0.611**  -0.718***  -0.604** 
  (0.276)  (0.257)  (0.276) 
   at Polity2=6  -0.715**  -0.825***  -0.728*** 
  (0.278)  (0.279)  (0.300) 
   at Polity2=10  -0.852***  -0.968***  -0.893*** 
  (0.329)  (0.348)  (0.369) 
R2 0.524 0.525 0.529 0.530 0.545 0.546 
N. observations 1974 1974 1701 1701 1816 1816 
N. of countries 91 91 80 80 91 91 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include a constant term, country and decade fixed effects, 
but we do not report their estimates to preserve space. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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Table A5.3: Effect of CBI on inflation, 1980-2013. Additional Robustness Checks: 
Democracy 
Dependent variable: Inflation rate (log)  
Estimation: Fixed Effects with robust standard errors 
 -10≤Polity2≤ -6  
 
-5≤Polity2≤ 0 1 ≤Polity2≤ 5 6 ≤Polity2≤ 10 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CBI  1.093 -1.673* -2.038*** -0.795* 
 (0.694) (0.939) (0.698) (0.443) 
Cap. account  -0.558*** 0.268 -0.467 -0.576*** 
       openness (0.206) (0.190) (0.409) (0.160) 
Peg -0.080 -0.722*** -0.314 -0.345*** 
 (0.112) (0.162) (0.222) (0.096) 
Inflationt-1  0.283*** 0.345** 0.020 0.552*** 
 (0.065) (0.130) (0.126) (0.064) 
GDP per capitat-1 -0.692*** 0.558 0.101 0.417** 
 (0.234) (0.835) (0.305) (0.183) 
Trade opennesst-1 0.007* -0.000 -0.005* -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) 
World inflationt-1 -0.015 -0.049 -0.009 -0.055** 
 (0.024) (0.046) (0.050) (0.022) 
Political  0.019 0.008 0.002 0.018* 
     instabilityt-1 (0.016) (0.018) (0.023) (0.010) 
R2 0.244 0.283 0.118 0.516 
N. observations 450 348 347 1096 
N. of countries 45 49 43 71 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include a constant term, country and decade fixed effects, 
but we do not report their estimates to preserve space. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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Table A5.4: Effect of CBI on inflation, 1980-2013. Additional Robustness Checks: Income 
Level 
Dependent variable: Inflation rate (log)  
Estimation: Fixed Effects with robust standard errors 
Region High non-OECD Middle  Low 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CBI  -0.920 -0.317 -1.116*** -0.856** 0.470 0.475 
 (0.856) (1.503) (0.401) (0.370) (0.679) (0.789) 
Democracy -0.016 0.001 0.001 0.025 -0.011 -0.009 
 (0.025) (0.036) (0.007) (0.017) (0.020) (0.039) 
CBI*Democracy  -0.063  -0.061  -0.004 
  (0.119)  (0.039)  (0.109) 
Cap. account  -0.557* -0.537 -0.579*** -0.543*** -0.706** -0.706** 
       openness (0.308) (0.312) (0.133) (0.136) (0.270) (0.273) 
Peg -0.033 -0.022 -0.358*** -0.357*** -0.187 -0.188 
 (0.101) (0.105) (0.078) (0.077) (0.140) (0.148) 
Inflationt-1  0.386** 0.388** 0.476*** 0.472*** 0.539*** 0.539*** 
 (0.137) (0.137) (0.070) (0.071) (0.170) (0.171) 
GDP per capitat-1 0.348 0.303 0.135 0.088 0.304 0.304 
 (0.401) (0.432) (0.129) (0.129) (0.351) (0.353) 
Trade opennesst-1 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
World inflationt-1 -0.053* -0.051 -0.049** -0.049** -0.049* -0.049* 
 (0.029) (0.031) (0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.024) 
Political  0.021 0.019 0.023** 0.023** -0.002 -0.002 
     instabilityt-1 (0.031) (0.032) (0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.020) 
Effect of CBI       
   at Polity2=1  -0.380  -0.916***  0.471 
  (1.406)  (0.370)  (0.703) 
   at Polity2=3  -0.507  -1.038***  0.462 
  (1.224)  (0.383)  (0.558) 
   at Polity2=6  -0.696  -1.220***  0.450 
  (0.996)  (0.429)  (0.464) 
   at Polity2=10  -0.949  -1.463***  0.433 
  (0.845)  (0.524)  (0.647) 
R2 0.324 0.325 0.428 0.430 0.330 0.330 
N. observations 191 191 1565 1565 380 380 
N. of countries 12 12 67 67 22 22 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include a constant term, country and decade fixed effects, 
but we do not report their estimates to preserve space. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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Table A5.5: Effect of CBI on inflation, 1980-2013. Additional Robustness Checks: Shorter 
Time Windows 
Dependent variable: Inflation rate (log)  
Estimation: Fixed Effects with robust standard errors 
Region 1990-2013 1980-2006 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CBI  -0.557** -0.464* -0.814*** -0.667** 
 (0.256) (0.260) (0.268) (0.333) 
Democracy -0.008 0.003 0.000 0.011 
 (0.008) (0.017) (0.006) (0.015) 
CBI*Democracy  -0.023  -0.029 
  (0.035)  (0.036) 
Cap. account  -0.497*** -0.490*** -0.529*** -0.514*** 
       openness (0.122) (0.122) (0.109) (0.109) 
Peg -0.255*** -0.255*** -0.286*** -0.284*** 
 (0.060) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060) 
Inflationt-1  0.269*** 0.268*** 0.331*** 0.330*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.045) (0.045) 
GDP per capitat-1 0.148 0.146 0.227 0.222 
 (0.132) (0.133) (0.184) (0.185) 
Trade opennesst-1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
World inflationt-1 -0.031 -0.031 0.040*** 0.040*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.012) (0.012) 
Political  0.015** 0.015** 0.019*** 0.018** 
     instabilityt-1 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Effect of CBI     
   at Polity2=1  -0.487*  -0.753** 
  (0.252)  (0.282) 
   at Polity2=3  -0.533**  -0.782*** 
  (0.251)  (0.273) 
   at Polity2=6  -0.602**  -0.839*** 
  (0.283)  (0.269) 
   at Polity2=10  -0.694*  -0.953*** 
  (0.369)  (0.316) 
R2 0.451 0.451 0.588 0.380 
N. observations 1853 1853 1541 1541 
N. of countries 108 108 102 102 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include a constant term, country and decade fixed effects, 
but we do not report their estimates to preserve space. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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Table A5.6: Effect of CBI on inflation, 1980-2013. Additional Robustness Checks: Omitting crises 
Dependent variable: Inflation rate (log)  
Estimation: Fixed Effects with robust standard errors 
Crises omitted Bank crises Currency crises Debt crises Any crises 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CBI  -0.655** -0.487* -0.643** -0.431 -0.673** -0.504* -0.547** -0.342 
 (0.262) (0.266) (0.256) (0.264) (0.257) (0.261) (0.253) (0.264) 
Democracy -0.006 0.008 -0.005 0.014 -0.006 0.009 -0.005 0.013 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.006) (0.013) (0.006) (0.014) (0.006) (0.013) 
CBI*Democracy  -0.037  -0.045  -0.036  -0.045 
  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029) 
Cap. account  -0.478*** -0.460*** -0.462*** -0.439*** -0.471*** -0.454*** -0.442*** -0.420*** 
       openness (0.093) (0.093) (0.092) (0.092) (0.088) (0.088) (0.092) (0.092) 
Peg -0.243*** -0.242*** -0.195*** -0.194*** -0.230*** -0.229*** -0.203*** -0.203*** 
 (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.052) (0.055) (0.054) (0.052) (0.052) 
Inflationt-1  0.327*** 0.325*** 0.330*** 0.327*** 0.332*** 0.330*** 0.333*** 0.331*** 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.050) (0.050) (0.047) (0.047) (0.051) (0.050) 
GDP per capitat-1 0.064 0.052 0.051 0.037 0.085 0.074 0.031 0.016 
 (0.119) (0.120) (0.128) (0.131) (0.129) (0.131) (0.124) (0.127) 
Trade opennesst-1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
World inflationt-1 -0.020 -0.019 -0.022* -0.021 -0.022* -0.021* -0.024* -0.023* 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
Political  0.013* 0.012* 0.010 0.009 0.014** 0.013* 0.010 0.009 
     instabilityt-1 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Effect of CBI         
   at Polity2=1  -0.523**  -0.476*  -0.540**  -0.386 
  (0.259)  (0.256)  (0.254)  (0.255) 
   at Polity2=3  -0.596**  -0.567**  -0.613**  -0.476* 
  (0.255)  (0.249)  (0.249)  (0.247) 
   at Polity2=6  -0.706***  -0.702***  -0.722***  -0.611*** 
  (0.272)  (0.265)  (0.268)  (0.261) 
   at Polity2=10  -0.852***  -0.882***  -0.867***  -0.791*** 
  (0.331)  (0.325)  (0.329)  (0.317) 
R2 0.485 0.485 0.489 0.490 0.508 0.509 0.473 0.474 
N. observations 2189 2189 2149 2149 2214 2214 2093 2093 
N. of countries 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include a constant term, country and decade fixed effects, but we do not report their estimates to preserve space.       
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
